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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Louis Milton Willis, the former Executive Director of 
the Legislature of the U.S. Virgin Islands, appeals his 
conviction on two counts of federal programs bribery and two 
counts of federal extortion.  From about 2009 to 2011, the 
Legislature’s main building on the island of St. Thomas 
underwent major renovations, which required the Legislature 
to seek out contractors.  The United States claims that, during 
this period, Willis engaged in a pattern of corrupt conduct 
involving several contractors working on the renovations.  
Specifically, the United States claims that Willis solicited and 
received a $3,000 cash bribe from one contractor, a $10,000 
“loan” and a new air conditioner for his home from a second, 
and a $5,000 kickback from a third.  According to the United 
States, these payments and kickbacks were all made to Willis 
to ensure that the contractors would continue to be awarded 
work on the renovations.  Willis was tried and convicted by a 
jury for charges related to the bribes solicited and was 
sentenced to a five-year prison term followed by a term of 
supervised release.   
 Willis argues that the District Court erred by (i) 
denying his pretrial motion to dismiss two counts of the 
indictment, (ii) denying his renewed motion for judgment of 
acquittal, and (iii) improperly admitting evidence of his prior 
acceptance of bribes.1  Because we find all of Willis’s 
arguments unavailing, we will affirm his conviction.2    
                                              
1 (Willis Br. 13.) 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3241.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 Government officials are vested with a duty to uphold 
the law and serve the best interests of the public.  This case 
involves a government employee who betrayed the trust of 
this country’s taxpaying citizens by abusing his power for his 
own benefit. 
 From 2009 to 2012, the United States Government 
appropriated $150 million in federal funds each fiscal year to 
the Government of the Virgin Islands.  During that period, 
Louis Milton “Lolo” Willis served as Executive Director of 
the Legislature for the Virgin Islands.  In that position, 
Willis’s main role was to direct and advise division heads and 
to oversee administrative matters under the supervision of the 
President of the Legislature.  He was also delegated the power 
from the President of the Legislature to administer contracts 
on behalf of the Legislature.   
 During Willis’s tenure as Executive Director, the 
Legislature’s main building underwent major renovations, 
and Willis was substantially involved in securing contractors 
to perform those renovations.  Three of those contractors – 
Wilson John Marie, Frank James, and Alwin Williams, Sr. – 
later testified at Willis’s trial.  Marie, James, and Williams 
stated that they all gave cash or other items of value to Willis 
to secure more government work or to ensure payment of 
their invoices for completed work. 
 Sometime in 2010, the U.S. Department of the Interior 
audited the Legislature’s administrative section while the 
renovations were taking place.  The Department then released 
a report that highlighted a number of flaws in the 
administrative section’s fiscal controls.  In the report, the 
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Department concluded that the Legislature had mismanaged 
public funds and that management of the Legislature lacked 
adequate financial safeguards.  According to the report, some 
contractors worked on the renovation without any written 
agreements, and others obtained “sole-source” contracts, 
which Willis alone negotiated and issued without going 
through the normal process of soliciting bids from multiple 
vendors.    
 After a federal investigation, an indictment eventually 
issued for Willis’s prosecution on extortion charges under 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a), which prohibits robbery or extortion 
affecting interstate commerce, and bribery charges under 18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1), which outlaws theft and bribery in entities 
receiving more than $10,000 in federal funds.  Before trial, 
Willis moved to dismiss the indictment.  The District Court 
denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. 
 During the trial, the United States presented substantial 
evidence in support of its case.  The three contractors testified 
on behalf of the United States, claiming to have been 
involved in the bribery and extortion.  Each of the contractors 
testified that they had given Willis things of value and had 
received some form of guaranteed work on the renovations in 
return. 
 Wilson Jean Marie was the first contractor to testify 
about his interactions with Willis.  What he described, in 
short, was a basic kickback scheme.  He stated that he was a 
carpenter in the U.S. Virgin Islands and claimed to have done 
renovation work on the Legislature’s main building from 
2010 to 2011.  He further stated that Willis drafted a contract 
for his work on the renovations.  Marie claimed that only 
Willis would review the hours that he submitted for work.  
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Willis would then apparently sign the invoice, and the 
Legislature’s Business Office would in turn pay Marie.  
Marie stated that he would then give some of the money he 
had been paid by the Legislature to Willis.   
 Marie explained that the payments to Willis were “[t]o 
keep the job going, keep [Marie] going for the job,”3 
suggesting that he paid Willis to secure more renovation 
work.  Marie also stated that he had given Willis “about 
$5,000,” divided up among three payments.4  Marie also 
described a 25% overhead fee that Willis paid him for his 
work, which apparently had no clear underlying purpose. 
 The second contractor to testify was Frank James.  
James said that he worked on the Legislature’s main building 
during the renovation at a rate of about $2,100 per month 
under a contract arranged by Willis.  He also testified that, at 
various points, Willis asked him for $1,000, which he said 
that he needed to pay back certain debts, but James refused.  
On another occasion, Willis asked James for $10,000, but, 
again, James refused.  Nevertheless, James said that he went 
to Willis’s home, inspected Willis’s home air conditioning 
units, and replaced one of the units without charging him for 
the value of the unit or for his services.  James estimated that 
the air conditioner had a value of about $1,100.  Finally, 
James claimed that he wrote a company check for $10,000 to 
a paving company in order to assist Willis with paving his 
driveway.  He described the money as a loan to Willis, but he 
said he was never repaid. 
                                              
3 (J.A. 390.)   
4 (Id.) 
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 Alwin Williams Sr. was the last contractor to testify 
against Willis.  Williams, the owner of a company that did 
excavation and demolition work, entered into a contract to 
excavate certain tree roots near the Legislature building.  He 
claimed that while he was working on the renovations, Willis 
told him that he was having money issues and needed help.  
Shortly after, Williams gave Willis $3,000 in cash, a payment 
which he claimed was made to ensure that Willis would “look 
out for [Williams] down the road,” presumably to ensure 
future awards for renovation work on the Legislature.5  
Williams also testified that, prior to serving as Executive 
Director of the Legislature, Willis had accepted certain bribes 
from Williams when Willis was working for the Virgin 
Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue.  Williams claimed to 
have paid the bribes to Willis for the purpose of having a 
Bureau of Internal Revenue tax levy lifted from his bank 
accounts. 
 The testimony of these three witnesses was bolstered 
by another witness for the United States, Clifford 
Charleswell, who explained that Willis told him that he had 
received money from the contractors during the renovation 
project.  All told, James, Williams, and Marie testified to 
giving Willis roughly $19,000 in kickbacks and other graft in 
exchange for over $300,000 in contract work on the 
renovations.   
 Michael Benjamin, the acting business director for the 
Legislature, also testified on behalf of the United States.  He 
stated that Willis was in charge of managing the contracts for 
the renovation work and that Willis answered solely to the 
                                              
5 (J.A. 621.) 
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President of the Legislature.  He also testified that Willis had 
the power to seek bids, find the best price, and select 
contractors.  He further claimed that funds used for the 
payment of contractors came from the Government of the 
Virgin Islands’ treasury.6  As to the procurement of 
contractors, Benjamin stated that sometimes the contracts 
would go through legal counsel to the Legislature for review, 
but sometimes they did not.  Once approved, the contracts 
would be signed and finalized by Willis or by the President of 
the Legislature.  Finally, Benjamin stated that Willis had the 
power to bind the Legislature to payment, including during 
the time that the renovations took place. 
 Debra Gottlieb, the Budget Director for the 
Government of the Virgin Islands Office of Management and 
Budget, also testified.  She stated that, as a matter of 
government accounting, federal funds were segregated from 
the Virgin Islands’ general funds in the Treasury.  She also 
testified that the Legislature only received money out of the 
general fund, which did not include federal funds.  She 
claimed that the federal funds were kept in a separate treasury 
fund.  
 At the conclusion of the testimony on behalf of the 
United States, Willis moved for a judgment of acquittal.  The 
court denied the motion.  After the close of all of the 
                                              
6 Benjamin’s testimony was ambiguous and conflicting as to 
whether or not those funds included only local funds or both 
local and federal funds.  (J.A. 464-65) (stating that annual 
budget for the Legislature consisted of “local funds,” but then 
claiming that the money was “appropriated” from “federal 
funds”). 
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evidence, Willis then renewed his motion for judgment of 
acquittal, which the court again denied.  Thereafter, the jury 
returned a verdict finding Willis guilty of federal programs 
bribery (Counts One and Three) and federal extortion (Counts 
Two and Four).  However, he was acquitted as to Counts Five 
and Six, charges stemming from the alleged bribes involving 
Marie.  This appeal followed. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment 
 
 Willis asserts several challenges to his conviction on 
appeal.7  First, he argues that the District Court erred by 
denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, 
claiming that the indictment failed to adequately set forth the 
elements of federal programs bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 
666(a)(1)(B).  In particular, he claims that Counts One and 
Three, the federal programs bribery charges, should have 
been dismissed for failure to allege a quid pro quo, that is, “a 
specific intent to give or receive something of value in 
exchange for an official act.”8   
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) requires an 
indictment to “be a plain, concise, and definite written 
statement of the essential facts charged.”  In United States v. 
                                              
7 We exercise plenary review over a challenge to the 
sufficiency of an indictment. United States v. Bansal, 663 
F.3d 634, 656 (3d Cir. 2011). 
8 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 
398, 404-05 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
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Rankin, we explained that an indictment is deemed sufficient 
so long as it “(1) contains the elements of the offense 
intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant 
of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the 
defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead 
a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent 
prosecution.”9  We have also said that “no greater specificity 
than the statutory language is required so long as there is 
sufficient factual orientation to permit the defendant to 
prepare his defense.”10  We should uphold the indictment 
“unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable 
construction, charge an offense.”11 
 Given the language of the statute, the essential 
elements that the United States must prove to establish a 
violation of § 666 here are that, at the time of the offense: (1) 
Willis was an agent of a state government or agency; (2) he 
corruptly solicited, demanded, or accepted something of value 
with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection 
with any business of the state government or agency; (3) he 
accepted something of value in connection with the business 
or transactions of the state government or agency, where the 
transactions involved anything of value of $5,000 or more; 
(4) the state received in excess of $10,000 in federal funds in 
                                              
9 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citation omitted). 
10 Rankin, 870 F.2d at 112. 
11 United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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any single year; and (5) he acted willfully and knowingly.12  
The statutory definitions under § 666(d)(4) further provide 
that the term “State” includes “a State of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or 
possession of the United States.”    
 Willis contends that the indictment is insufficient as to 
the federal programs bribery charges because it fails to charge 
an essential element of the offense: a quid pro quo.  Willis 
concedes that this Circuit has yet to decide whether § 666 
requires charging and proof of a quid pro quo to sustain a 
conviction13 and urges us to adopt such a requirement.  To 
that end, Willis argues that the indictment must set forth facts 
supporting an allegation of “specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act.”14   
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v) 
authorizes a defendant to lodge a pretrial challenge to the 
sufficiency of an indictment for “failure to state an offense.”  
There are two primary ways in which a defendant can 
proceed with such a challenge.  First, a defendant may 
contend that, under the first Rankin element, “an indictment is 
insufficient on the basis that it does not satisfy the first 
requirement in that it fails to charge an essential element of 
                                              
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 666; United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 
444 (3d Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. Foley, 851 F. Supp. 
507, 509 n.1 (D. Conn. 1994).   
13 See United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“We have never decided whether § 666(a)(2) requires 
proof of a quid pro quo . . . .”).  
14 Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404-05.  
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the crime.”15  Second, “because an indictment that merely 
‘recites in general terms the essential elements of the offense’ 
does not satisfy the second and third requirements, a 
defendant may also claim that an indictment fails to state an 
offense on the basis that ‘the specific facts alleged . . . fall 
beyond the scope of the relevant criminal statute, as a matter 
of statutory interpretation.’”16  It appears that Willis asserts 
the first type of challenge, claiming that a quid pro quo 
should be an element of a § 666 offense and that the United 
States failed to include it in the indictment.   
 In response, the United States argues that § 666 does 
not include a quid pro quo requirement and that we should 
follow those Circuits that have declined to read such a 
requirement into the statute.17  The United States further 
                                              
15 United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
16 Id. (quoting United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 
(3d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in 
United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
17 We note that many of our sister circuits are split over this 
question.  Compare United States v. Redzic, 627 F.3d 683, 
692 (8th Cir. 2010) (requiring a quid pro quo), United States 
v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 148-50 (2d Cir. 2007) (same, on 
plain-error review), and United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 
1006, 1020-22 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding plain error but 
affirming the conviction where the jury instruction omitted a 
quid pro quo element), with United States v. McNair, 605 
F.3d 1152, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2010) (no quid pro quo 
required), United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520-21 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (same), and United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 
714-15 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).  “And to some extent, 
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contends that, even if we were to incorporate such a 
requirement into § 666, the indictment adequately alleged a 
quid pro quo as to all counts.   
 The bribery proscriptions are covered in subsections 
(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) of § 666. Subsection (a)(1)(B), which 
covers one who requests a bribe, provides:  
Whoever . . . being an agency of an organization, 
or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, 
or any agency thereof . . . corruptly solicits or 
demands . . . anything of value from any person, 
intending to be influenced or rewarded in 
connection with any business, transaction, or 
series of transactions of such organization, 
government, or agency involving anything of 
value of $5,000 or more . . . shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.18 
 
  Put another way, § 666 criminalizes the acceptance of 
a bribe of $5,000 or more by a government agent of a local 
government that receives more than $10,000 a year in federal 
funds if the agent intends to be influenced by the bribe when 
making a decision to enter into business on behalf of the 
government.   
                                                                                                     
confusion reigns in this area because courts often use the term 
quid pro quo to describe an exchange other than a particular 
item of value for a particular action.”  McNair, 605 F.3d at 
1190. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 666(a). 
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 Contrary to Willis’s contention, each § 666 Count that 
he challenges clearly alleged a quid pro quo.  For instance, 
Count One of the indictment alleged: 
In or about 2009 to 2010, at St. Thomas, in the 
District of the Virgin Islands, the defendant, 
LOUIS MILTON “LOLO” WILLIS while an 
agent of the Government of the Virgin Islands, 
did corruptly solicit, demand, accept, and agree 
to accept anything of value from any person 
with the intent to be influenced and rewarded in 
connection with any business, transaction, and 
series of transactions of such government, 
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more, 
in that WILLIS accepted cash payments 
from Contractor A in exchange for 
WILLIS’s use of his official position to 
provide favorable treatment for Contractor 
A in the award of contracting work at the 
Legislature of the Virgin Islands and to 
ensure payment to Contractor A for such 
work.19 
 
 Similarly, Count Three of the indictment specifically 
alleged: 
In or about 2009 to 2011, at St. Thomas, in the 
District of the Virgin Islands, the defendant, 
LOUIS MILTON “LOLO” WILLIS while an 
agent of the Government of the Virgin Islands, 
                                              
19 (J.A. 76.) (emphasis added). 
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did corruptly solicit, demand, accept, and agree 
to accept anything of value from any person 
with the intent to be influenced and rewarded in 
connection with any business, transaction, and 
series of transactions of such government, 
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more, 
in that WILLIS accepted $10,000, an air 
conditioning unit, and free labor associated 
with the installation of the air conditioning 
unit from Contractor B in exchange for 
WILLIS’s use of his official position to 
provide favorable treatment for Contractor 
B in the award of contracting work at the 
Legislature of the Virgin Islands and to 
ensure payment to Contractor B for such 
work.20 
 
 Thus, even if we were to require the United States to 
allege and prove a quid pro quo to establish a § 666 bribery 
offense – which we decline to do here – we conclude that it 
was adequately alleged in the indictment.  Put simply, the 
indictment stated that Willis accepted cash payments from the 
various contractors in exchange for the use of his official 
position to provide favorable treatment for each contractor in 
the award of more contracting work at the Legislature.  
Moreover, we conclude that the indictment adequately 
alleged all other required elements of the offense: the parties, 
the relevant amounts of money exchanged, where the illegal 
                                              
20 (J.A. 78.) (emphasis added). 
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transactions allegedly occurred, that Willis used his public 
position unlawfully, the specific details of each transaction, 
and the improper purposes alleged under the relevant federal 
statutes.  The District Court therefore properly refused to 
dismiss the federal programs bribery charges under Counts 
One and Three. 
B. The District Court 
properly denied Willis’s 
renewed motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
 
 Next, Willis argues that the District Court erred in 
denying his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal as to 
the federal programs bribery charges.  He contends that the 
United States failed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites 
to those charges because it failed to prove a sufficient nexus 
between Willis’s alleged conduct or his status as Executive 
Director and any corresponding effect on federal funds.  In 
particular, he asserts that: (1) the Legislature of the Virgin 
Islands is distinct from the Government of the Virgin Islands 
and received no federal funds; (2) he served as an agent of the 
Legislature, and not of the Government of the Virgin Islands, 
thus lacking sufficient connection to federal funds; and (3) the 
Government failed to adduce evidence sufficient to show that 
the Legislature received a federal “benefit” within the 
meaning of § 666.  In short, all of his challenges hinge on his 
ability to separate himself from the federal funds, something 
we conclude that he cannot do.21   
                                              
21 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant or 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 
17 
 
i. The Legislature of the 
Virgin Islands is a covered 
entity under § 666. 
 
 We first address Willis’s contention that he is entitled 
to judgment of acquittal on the federal programs bribery 
charges because the Virgin Islands Legislature is separate and 
distinct from the Government of the Virgin Islands and 
therefore does not receive federal funds.  Section 666 
establishes federal jurisdiction over bribery and fraud 
committed by agents of covered entities, including a state or 
territorial “government, or any agency thereof,” that receives 
in excess of $10,000 in federal funds in a twelve-month 
period.22   The statute defines “government agency” as “a 
subdivision of the executive, legislative, judicial, or other 
branch of government, including a department, independent 
establishment, commission, administration, authority, board, 
                                                                                                     
123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).  A judgment of acquittal is 
appropriate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 if, 
after reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we determine that no rational jury could have 
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  United 
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that, in addressing a Rule 29 motion, a district court 
must “‘review the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on the available evidence’” (quoting United States v. 
Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
22 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
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and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity 
established, and subject to control, by a government or 
governments for the execution of a governmental or 
intergovernmental program.”23  
 The purpose of this statute is to enhance the ability of 
the United States to “vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, 
and bribery involving federal monies” and “to protect the 
integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through 
Federal programs.”24 The history of § 666 reveals Congress’s 
intent to root out public corruption.  In enacting § 666 as part 
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress 
expressly intended “to augment the ability of the United 
States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery 
involving Federal monies that are disbursed to private 
organizations or State and local governments pursuant to a 
federal program.”25   
 Moreover, courts have specifically recognized that 
§ 666 is broad in scope.26  As the Sixth Circuit noted in 
United States v. Valentine, “it is apparent that Congress 
intended to expand the federal government’s prosecutorial 
                                              
23 Id. 
24 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 369-70 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510. 
25 Id. at 369. 
26 See Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 321 (stating that § 666 is “broad in 
scope, as that statute seeks to ensure the integrity of vast 
quantities of federal funds” (citation and internal quotation 
omitted)). 
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power to encompass significant misapplication of federal 
funds at a local level.”27    
 In addressing Willis’s first argument that the 
Legislature falls outside the scope of § 666, it is first 
important to keep in mind the structure of the Government of 
the Virgin Islands, which was created under the “Revised 
Organic Act,” 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.  That statute vests the 
power of the Government of the Virgin Islands in three 
coequal branches: the legislative, the executive, and the 
judicial.  These three branches constitute one territorial entity, 
which is substantially funded by the federal government.  
Indeed, it is undisputed that the Government of the Virgin 
Islands received $150 million dollars in federal funds per year 
from 2009 to 2012 and that the renovations took place during 
this time.  Thus, contrary to Willis’s assertion, we conclude 
the Legislature is part and parcel of the Government of the 
Virgin Islands, and it received federal funds.   
 Willis nonetheless relies on Debra Gottlieb’s 
testimony wherein she claimed that the Legislature never 
received federal funds, as it was funded by a segregated, 
general fund consisting of local funds derived from territorial 
sources.  Based on this testimony, Willis claims that the 
Legislature (1) lacks direct control over the disbursement of 
federal funds, and (2) did not receive any federal funds.   
 We begin by noting that courts have been wary of 
interpreting § 666 too narrowly.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly avoided constructions of § 666 that would 
impose limits beyond those set out in the plain meaning of the 
                                              
27 63 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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statute.  In Salinas v. United States,28 for example, the Court 
rejected a defendant’s attempt to read into the statute an 
extra-textual requirement of proof that “the bribe in some way 
affected federal funds, for instance by diverting or 
misappropriating them, before the bribe violates 
§ 666(a)(1)(B).”29  In reaching its conclusion, this Court 
pointed to the “enactment’s expansive, unqualified language, 
both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered.”30  
 The Supreme Court has also rejected an argument that 
§ 666 is unconstitutional because it does not require a nexus 
between the bribe and some federal monies or program.  In 
Sabri v. United States,31 the Court noted that the enactment of 
§ 666 was “an instance of necessary and proper legislation” to 
execute Congress’s spending power, especially in light of the 
fact that “other legislation had failed to protect federal 
interests.”32  The Court stated that while “not every bribe or 
kickback offered or paid to agents of governments covered by 
§ 666(b) will be traceably skimmed from specific federal 
payments, or show up in the guise of a quid pro quo for some 
dereliction in spending a federal grant,” the absence of such 
links does not “portend[ ] . . . enforcement beyond the scope 
of federal interest, for the reason that corruption does not 
have to be that limited to affect the federal interest.”33  And, 
                                              
28 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
29 Id. at 55-56. 
30 Id. at 56. 
31 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
32 Id. at 607. 
33 Id. at 600-01. 
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perhaps most relevant to the present case, the Court said that 
“Congress was within its prerogative to ensure that the 
objects of spending are not menaced by local administrators 
on the take.”34 
 Willis’s related argument that the Legislature of the 
Virgin Islands never “received” federal funds is also 
undermined by the First Circuit’s 2013 decision in United 
States v. Fernandez,35 relied upon by the District Court in its 
opinion.  In Fernandez, the court found that the territorial 
Legislature of Puerto Rico was part and parcel of the 
government of the territory, and that the principles of 
separation of powers did not exempt an agent of the 
Legislature of Puerto Rico, a Senator, from § 666’s 
coverage.36  The First Circuit’s holding also supports our 
conclusion that the Legislature was part and parcel of the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, a federally funded entity. 
 Therefore, we conclude that Willis’s narrow reading of 
§ 666’s scope is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the 
statute and the broad interpretations of that law advanced by 
the Supreme Court.  Thus, we further conclude that the 
Legislature, as a coequal branch of the Government of the 
Virgin Islands – itself a territorial “government” that receives 
in excess of $10,000 in federal funds in a twelve-month 
period – fell within the scope of § 666 by receiving federal 
funds.37  We therefore reject Willis’s argument that he cannot 
                                              
34 Id. at 601. 
35 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
36 Id. at 10-12. 
37 18 U.S.C. § 666. 
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face criminal liability under § 666 because the Legislature 
received funds only from territorial sources.  
ii. Willis was an “agent” 
within the meaning of 
§ 666. 
 
 In attempting to further sever his connection from the 
federal funds at issue, Willis also argues that he was not “a 
person authorized to act on behalf of . . . a government” as a 
“servant or employee, . . . director, officer, manager, and 
representative.”38  We find this argument equally 
unpersuasive.  The plain language of the statute merely 
requires that the individual be “authorized to act on behalf of 
another person or government.”39  Testimony at trial 
established that Willis, as Executive Director of the 
Legislature, had the authority to “go out and seek offers for a 
particular project . . . [w]hatever project [was] deemed 
necessary”; that he could determine whether or not it “was the 
best price”; and that he or the President of the Legislature 
could unilaterally enter into a contract for whatever price that 
person wanted.40  Thus, Willis’s claim that he was not an 
agent of the government is without merit.   
 In Fernandez, the First Circuit rejected a similar 
argument, concluding that two senators were agents of the 
government because they were a part of the limited category 
of government officials who represent the “State” as a 
                                              
38 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1).   
39 Id. 
40 (J.A. 470.) 
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whole.41  As the United States correctly notes here, 
Fernandez supports the conclusion that a territorial legislature 
is part and parcel of the government of the territory, and that 
the principles of separation of powers do not excuse an agent 
of the Legislature from § 666’s coverage.  Willis simply 
cannot escape the conclusion that he was an agent of the 
Virgin Islands’ Government, given his substantial power to 
enter into contracts on behalf of the Legislature. 
iii. The Legislature received 
a “benefit” within  the 
meaning of § 666. 
 
 Willis next argues that the United States failed to 
present evidence of the “structure, operation, and purpose” of 
the federal funds sufficient to show that the Virgin Islands 
Legislature received a federal “benefit” within the meaning of 
§ 666.42  Section 666, by its plain terms, limits its application 
to qualifying entities that receive “benefits in excess of 
$10,000 . . . under a Federal Program.”43  Although the term 
“benefit” is not defined in the statute, Willis nonetheless 
argues that the United States failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating that the Government of the Virgin Islands 
received some type of specific beneficial interest from the 
federal funds to satisfy § 666’s jurisdictional requirements.  
We find this argument to be without merit.   
                                              
41 722 F.3d at 9. 
42 (Willis Br. 29.) 
43 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). 
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 In Fischer v. United States,44 the Supreme Court found 
§ 666 to be constitutional as applied where the identified 
benefit was far more attenuated than the one involved here.45  
There, the federal funds received by healthcare providers 
were Medicaid reimbursement payments made by the federal 
government to the providers in exchange for services 
rendered to Medicaid and Medicare recipients.46  Rejecting 
the notion that the patients – as opposed to the service 
providers – received the only “benefit” under the program, 
the Court stated that the service providers “derive significant 
advantage by satisfying the participation standards imposed 
by the Government.  These advantages constitute benefits 
within the meaning of the federal bribery statute.”47  The 
Fischer Court also emphasized that § 666 is “expansive . . . 
both as to the [conduct] forbidden and the entities covered.”48  
Thus, the Fischer Court read the statute to reveal Congress’s 
“expansive, unambiguous intent to ensure the integrity of 
organizations participating in federal assistance programs.”49  
 Here, as the District Court noted, the link to a benefit 
is fairly direct.  The Government of the Virgin Islands 
received $150 million per year during the time that Willis was 
Executive Director.  Those funds, paid directly by the federal 
government, significantly supported the Government of the 
                                              
44 529 U.S. 667 (2000). 
45 Id. at 680. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id. (citing Salinas 522 U.S. at 56). 
49 Id. 
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Virgin Islands during that period.  In consequence, we find 
Willis’s argument that the Virgin Islands did not receive a 
“benefit” within the meaning of § 666 completely unavailing.   
 Because we conclude that all of Willis’s challenges to 
the applicability of § 666 lack merit, we will therefore affirm 
the District Court’s denial of Willis’s judgment of acquittal as 
to Counts One and Three. 
C. Section 666 does not 
violate the Tenth 
Amendment or the 
Spending Clause. 
 
 Willis also challenges his conviction under § 666 on 
Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause grounds.  Willis 
claims that, to permit the application of § 666 as to his 
conduct in these circumstances would “transform § 666 into a 
general police power,” in violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.50  He further claims that the application of § 666 
to his conduct would exceed Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause.51  He is wrong. 
 First, the Tenth Amendment reserves certain powers to 
“the States,” but it has never been extended to the Virgin 
Islands.  In fact, as the United States again correctly points 
out, the Revised Organic Act of 1954, which dictates the 
limits of constitutional protection afforded to the territory, 
incorporates only the first nine amendments and not the Tenth 
                                              
50 (Willis Br. 16.) 
51 (Id.) 
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Amendment.52  At least one other court has also explicitly 
stated that “[t]he limits of the Tenth Amendment do not apply 
to” a constitutional territory because the territory’s “powers 
are not ‘[those] reserved to the States’ but those specifically 
granted to it by Congress under its constitution.”53  We agree 
that the Tenth Amendment does not apply here and therefore 
reject Willis’s argument. 
 Willis also claims that to apply § 666 to his conduct 
would “exceed the proper bounds of Congress under the 
spending clause.”54  Under the Spending Clause, Congress 
has the power to “appropriate federal moneys to promote the 
general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and it has corresponding 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that 
power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”55  With 
respect to those powers, in Sabri v. United States, the 
Supreme Court noted that the enactment of § 666 was “an 
instance of necessary and proper legislation” to execute 
Congress’s spending power, especially in light of the fact that 
“other legislation had failed to protect federal interests.”56  
Willis’s Spending Clause argument is thus foreclosed by 
Supreme Court precedent.   
                                              
52 48 U.S.C. § 1561. 
53 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 
344 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; 
amend. X), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).  
54 (Willis Br. 32.) 
55 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).   
56 Id. at 607. 
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D. The District Court 
properly admitted 
evidence of Willis’s 
prior acceptance of 
bribes. 
  
 Finally, Willis contends that the District Court erred in 
denying his motion to exclude certain prior-act evidence 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).57  Rule 404(b) 
provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove character or demonstrate action in 
conformity with those acts.58  Prior-act evidence, though, may 
be admitted “for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”59  To be admissible, 
prior-act evidence must satisfy the test set forth in Huddleston 
v. United States.60  As the Supreme Court stated there, the 
proffered evidence must be: (1) offered for a proper purpose 
under Rule 404(b)(2); (2) relevant to that purpose; (3) 
sufficiently probative under the Rule 403 balancing 
requirement; and (4) accompanied by a limiting instruction, if 
                                              
57 We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings 
principally for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Kolodesh, 
787 F.3d 224, 234 n.12 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 281 (2016).  To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, Willis 
must show the district court’s action was “arbitrary, fanciful 
or clearly unreasonable.”  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 
196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009). 
58 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
59 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
60 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
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requested.61  We have also emphasized that the proffered 
evidence must fit “into a chain of logical inferences, no link 
of which may be the inference that the defendant has the 
propensity to commit the crime charged.”62  
 Willis’s defense at trial was that he did not know that 
the money he solicited and received from contractors 
constituted bribes and instead understood them to be loans.  
The United States offered evidence that Willis had accepted a 
kickback bribe from Williams when Willis was the Director 
of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue, in exchange 
for lifting a lien on Williams’s bank account.  The United 
States offered this evidence to demonstrate that Willis was 
not mistaken about the nature of the transactions involved in 
the Legislature’s renovation and fully intended to accept 
bribes and commit extortion.  The prior-acts were also offered 
as evidence of motive and knowledge.  
 Contrary to Willis’s assertion, there was a strong nexus 
between this evidence and his state of mind, his intent, his 
knowledge, and the absence of any mistake about the 
transactions.  This evidence showed that he knew that these 
payments were not loans, that they were not gifts, and that he 
intended to accept cash in exchange for handing out more 
government contract work.  Moreover, the record reveals that 
the District Court discussed the issues substantially with the 
                                              
61 Id. at 691-92. 
62 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d 
Cir. 1994)). 
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parties, accepted submissions from them, and further engaged 
with them at a pretrial omnibus hearing before ruling on the 
admission of the evidence.  Before admitting the evidence, 
the court also provided a specific limiting instruction to the 
jury as a prophylactic measure against any tendency by the 
jury to consider the evidence for improper purposes.  
Consequently, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Willis’s prior 
conduct.63   
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For these reasons, and those set forth in the District 
Court’s thorough and persuasive opinion, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
63 We have thoroughly reviewed all of Willis’s remaining 
arguments, including his Commerce Clause challenge to his 
conviction of Hobbs Act extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 
and find them to be without merit.   
